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Russia and the EU:  
The global Cooperation Agenda 
Alexander Titov
two factors are important for effective cooperation with russia in the wider world. First, the Eu needs to develop a downgraded, ‘values-light’ agenda focused on solving concrete challenges. Second, to achieve 
the first point, a common minimum set of shared principles needs to be agreed upon. the need for such 
change is underscored by structural barriers for constructing an international community based on general 
solidarity of interests and values held central to the Eu. 
There is a growing awareness of the limits to the EU’s 
solidarist or normative approach to international 
relations, particularly evident in the Middle East, East 
Asia and even Europe, as exemplified in the Ukraine 
crisis.1 The opposition to the EU’s normative approach 
is usually expressed in the concept of a multipolar 
world or pluralist international society, favoured by 
Russia among others.2 At the same time, there are 
challenges in security and other areas that demand a 
shared response from international actors who do not 
necessarily agree on all normative principles. 
In dealing with Russia on global issues the EU should, 
therefore, develop a reduced agenda of short to 
medium-term aims, which are achievable without 
insistence on Moscow subscribing to the entire 
normative framework expected from the countries 
within the EU. To facilitate this turn, an attempt 
should be made to find a common denominator in 
their approach to international affairs. These minimum 
principles, acceptable to both Russia and the EU, can 
be defined as the basic package of the Westphalian 
system: sovereignty, territoriality, diplomacy, and great 
power management of global issues.3 
The following chapter examines what those common 
principles between Russia and the EU could consist of, 
and explores how this modified approach can facilitate 
cooperation between Russia and the EU on several 
issues on the global agenda. Specifically, the focus will 
be on Syria, Turkey, the Middle East, and China, as well 
as non-regionally specific topics such as international 
trade, terrorism, and migration.
 
SyrIA
The case of Syria is perhaps the most important 
current example of differences and potential for 
cooperation between Russia and the EU. There has 
been a fundamental difference in Russia and Europe’s 
perceptions of the causes of the Syrian drama. 
The EU saw the uprising against Assad as a legitimate 
expression of popular discontent. Moscow’s view was 
more aware of the complex nature of Syria, with its 
ethnic and religious diversity sitting uncomfortably 
alongside a close-knit ruling group in charge of a strong 
army and security apparatus. Combined with intricate 
regional rivalries between the Gulf states, Turkey and 
Iran, the swift demise of the Syrian regime was seen as 
unlikely and – given the likely rise of extreme Islamic 
groups in its place – undesirable.
The Syrian case has allowed the Kremlin to pursue a 
policy that exemplified its core principles in international 
affairs: the priority of stability over revolutionary 
change, and state sovereign rights over humanitarian 
intervention.4 At the centre of Moscow’s criticism was 
the West’s interventionist agenda of democratisation 
that has made the situation in the Middle East worse 
– from Iraq to Libya and Syria. President Putin5 has 
consistently argued that the known devil of secular 
authoritarian states is the only effective structure to 
keep religious fundamentalism at bay.
A compromise over Syria has been hindered by these 
fundamental disagreements about the causes of the 
conflict. The immediate removal of Assad has until 
recently been a non-negotiable condition for the West, 
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while Moscow sees the current regime as the only force 
able to defeat IS. However, in the aftermath of the Paris 
attacks by the IS, some EU members, notably France, 
are moving closer to Moscow’s position of side-lining 
the issue of Assad’s fate for as long as it is necessary in 
order to defeat IS.
This might provide the beginning of a broader 
realignment of EU-Russia relations. The key would be 
to focus on practical solutions to a shared security 
concern, in this case destroying IS. In order to achieve 
this, there will have to be a division between primary 
goals (defeat of the IS), medium goals (the end to the 
Syrian civil war), and long-term goals (the establishment 
of democracy in Syria). To achieve the first two goals, a 
compromise with Russia is inevitable. This will require 
re-assessment of the EU’s order of priorities in foreign 
policy, specifically the role of its normative goals. This 
may create a precedent on formulating a new model 
for dealing with Russia.
 
turKEy
Relations between Russia and Turkey, the EU’s two largest 
neighbours, have been forced on to the international 
agenda after the shooting down of a Russian warplane 
by the Turkish Air Force in November 2015. Mediating 
the fallout might require considerable effort because 
the incident was not a tragic misunderstanding, but a 
logical development from the two countries’ differences 
over Syria. 
Turkey, with its 2 million refugees, remains the key to 
the EU’s attempts to manage the refugee crisis. At the 
same time, Turkey’s main objective, preventing the 
establishment of a Kurdish state, as well as support for 
some controversial rebel groups in Syria pose serious 
dilemmas for the EU. Worryingly, the shooting down of 
the Russian warplane can be seen as a Turkish attempt 
to impose a no-fly zone in Syria along its border, at the 
very time when Western opinion has been shifting 
towards Russia’s position on Syria.
At the heart of the current standoff with Turkey is 
Moscow’s belief that secular authoritarian rulers are 
the only effective bulwark against radical Islam in the 
Middle East. The Kremlin genuinely feels the threat of 
radical Islam to its domestic security and international 
order. This puts it at odds with Ankara’s position of 
promoting religious revival in the Muslim world under 
its stewardship.
In both Russia and Turkey, the EU faces similar dilemmas 
over the principles guiding its foreign policy.6 President 
Erdogan’s politics are underpinned by Islamic revival, 
his aspirations as a leader of the Islamic world are 
evident, for example, in his open support for the Muslim 
Brotherhood in Egypt and Syria. The openly stated desire 
to restore Turkey’s leading role in the region and the 
world has clear parallels with the Russian behaviour in 
Ukraine and the post-Soviet space.
The EU’s approach to foreign policy is based on 
expanding its community of values.7 Russia, on the 
other hand, protects the Westphalian system based 
on state sovereignty, non-intervention, diplomacy and 
great power balance. As a result, the EU’s normative 
expansion has been securitised by Russia, seeing it and 
its derivatives such as human rights, democracy, and 
civil society, as a direct threat to the established system 
of sovereign statehood. Turkey is closer to Russia on 
these issues even if it is not so open about it.
Russo-Turkish relations are likely to occupy the EU’s 
foreign policy because of the impact they will have 
on the current refugee crisis and the conduct of the 
Syrian civil war. In addition, energy politics, the issue 
of EU enlargement and the Ukraine crisis, particularly 
with regards to the issue of Crimean Tatars, who are 
historically close to Turkey, are also likely to be affected. 
The EU’s role should be that of a mediator between 
Russia and Turkey, as stabilising those relations is a key 
component in enhancing security and stability in the 
EU’s immediate neighbourhood. 
 
tHE mIDDLE EASt
The fundamental danger in the Middle East is 
the collapse of the state as the dominant actor in 
international and social order. Relatively robust in the 
Middle East until 2003, the state as the core actor is 
being overtaken by non-state elements such as IS or 
violent anarchy, as has occurred in Libya.8
Both Russia and the EU have shared interests in 
preserving the basic building blocks of international 
system in the Middle East: state sovereignty, territoriality, 
and recourse to diplomacy as the prime means of 
solving disputes. For this to work, the EU needs to 
accept Russia’s emphasis on limits to intervention on 
normative grounds, and engage itself in great power 
management as a pre-condition for addressing the 
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challenges in the Middle East, including effective action 
against international terrorism.
In this context, Iran’s nuclear deal can serve as an 
example of successful cooperation between EU 
members and Russia on a shared security problem. 
It was achieved by focusing on clear objectives and 
accepting diplomacy as the main medium for reaching 
a compromise. As a consequence of Western sanctions 
being lifted, Iran is emerging as a potential replacement 
or counter-balance to Russia as a principal gas supplier 
to Europe. However, in dealing with Iran the EU would 
have to cooperate economically with a regime that 
does not share its core values to an even greater degree 
than Russia. 
Egypt is another example of a problematic 
transformation in the Middle East. The Al Sisi regime 
is friendly with Russia for exactly the same reason that 
it has strained relations with the EU: the normative 
break in understanding political legitimacy between 
the EU and Russia. For the former, popular expression 
is all important; for the latter stability and preservation 
of secular state structures are paramount. However, the 
dangers to the very basis of the modern international 
order across the Middle East should help the EU 
and Russia agree on a minimal agenda of restoring 
sovereignty, and related principles of territorial integrity 
and non-interference in the domestic affairs of other 
states as the lynchpin of the international law. This 
would have significant implications for solving the 
Ukraine crisis.
 
cHInA
One of the most important long-term factors arising 
from Russia’s current estrangement from the EU is the 
impact it has on Russia’s relations with China.9 This has 
repercussions for the general balance of power in the 
world and might significantly affect the EU’s economic 
and political security.
Differences in Russia’s approach to China and the EU 
are best summarised by the absence of a normative 
dimension in Beijing’s foreign policy. As a consequence, 
this has enabled Russia to build closer relations with 
China than the EU, even though the Kremlin is well 
aware of the strategic challenges presented to Russia 
by the rise of China. 
There are several reasons for Russia’s nuanced approach 
to China’s presence in the former Soviet space. First, 
it can be argued that this is a case of Russia joining a 
project it cannot resist. Acceptance by Russia that China 
is stronger economically means it is seen as crucial to 
build relations with China, amicably manage its rise, and 
derive benefits from a special relation with it.
Second, in contrast to the EU, Russia and China have 
no ideological basis between for intrusion into each 
other’s internal affairs. Consequently, there is no need 
to fend off demands for improving democracy and 
allegations of human rights abuses that have often 
been the stumbling block in EU-Russian relations. On 
the contrary, China is willing to acknowledge Russia as 
an equal – at least verbally – and eschews the moralising 
tone typical of the EU’s approach. 
Not being able to exclude both China and the West 
from the former Soviet space, the Kremlin seems to 
prefer China because it is more comfortable with 
it ideologically, it offers an appearance of equality, 
and is willing to delegate to Russia pre-eminence in 
political and security spheres. This will allow Russia to 
consolidate its hold on Eurasia at the expense of the 
US and the EU. This poses a significant challenge to 
the EU’s ambition of creating a stable neighbourhood 
and may require further re-assessment of its relations 
with Russia in a wider context of world politics, 
perhaps by moderating its normative thrust in areas of 
practical concern.
 
SAnctIonS AnD GLobALISAtIon
The near universal acceptance of free market 
globalisation has been the key Western achievement 
of the modern era.10 The EU should safeguard and 
promote this achievement, which is being undermined 
by politically motivated economic sanctions that 
inevitably create a negative link between globalisation 
and national security. 
The politicisation of the only universally accepted 
element of globalisation – free trade and economic 
liberalisation – leads to further securitisation of 
international trade and finance by Russia, already seen 
in a range of economic legislation. However, there is 
a wider problem of entrenching the idea of inherent 
potential danger in dependence on Western markets 
and finances by non-Western countries in general. 
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The EU should re-consider whether its security and 
prosperity is better advanced by entrenchment of 
Western institutions as the main standard around 
the world, or if economic sanctions can be used as 
an effective tool in foreign policy, which necessarily 
would undermine universal acceptance of Western-led 
globalisation. The issue of mutual dependence, and 
whether it enhances or endangers security, has not 
disappeared from the EU-Russia agenda. 
There is a clear need for a more predictable system in 
international trade, particularly as there is a danger 
of the re-emergence of trading blocs as the principal 
forms of economic organisation of the world economy.11 
Within this context, continuing tension between the 
EU and Russia may prompt the latter to strengthen its 
ties with China to a much greater degree than Moscow 
would have found comfortable otherwise. The key is to 
agree on some basic principles which would safeguard 
Western-led globalisation, while removing incentives 
for non-Western countries to create rival systems to 
protect themselves against any future Western threats.
 
concLuSIonS
The current juncture in foreign affairs poses many 
dilemmas for the EU and its member states. In the two 
crises dominating its foreign policy agenda, Ukraine 
and Syria, the EU is constrained to find a new model 
for dealing with the rapidly changing world. Russia 
presents opportunities for revamping the EU’s foreign 
policy on a more sustainable basis for two, seemingly 
contradictory, reasons. 
Russia’s failure to fully democratise since 1991 means 
that it has a normative chasm in relations with the 
EU. This includes resistance to basic principles the 
EU is aspiring to embed in international relations: 
equality, human rights, democratic principles, and 
liberal rights of individuals. A challenge for the EU 
is to deal with a country which openly questions its 
fundamental values.  This is particularly difficult because 
the extension of these values to the rest of the world 
has been regarded by the EU as a guarantee of global 
security and prosperity.12 
Yet there is an opportunity too. Despite the gap in 
understanding the underlying principles of international 
organization, Russia is historically and culturally closer to 
the EU than most countries in the EU’s neighbourhood. 
It retains and promotes the classical approach to 
international affairs, broadly based on realism or 
pluralism, whose elements are necessary for a more 
sustainable and pragmatic foreign policy.13 The EU 
could benefit from rediscovering the core basics of 
international system by focusing on managing tensions 
between states through agreeing on common rules 
and principles, rather than by imposing its core values 
onto the rest.
A re-establishing of an agreement on some basic 
rules and institutions of international system, which 
will be acceptable to all international actors, could be 
an important step in building a secure international 
environment for the EU and the world. Finding a modus 
vivendi with Russia could, therefore, serve as a workable 
model for the rest of the world.
 
PoLIcy rEcommEnDAtIonS
1. The EU needs to develop a downgraded, 
‘values-light’ agenda for dealing with Russia 
on global issues. The focus should be on 
solving concrete challenges over the short to 
medium term, for example in Syria, which are 
achievable regardless of Russia’s acceptance 
of the normative framework expected from 
the EU or those aspiring to join it. 
2. A common minimum set of shared principles 
in international relations needs to be agreed 
upon. These minimum principles at present 
can be defined as the basic package of the 
Westphalian system: sovereignty, territoriality, 
diplomacy and great power management of 
global issues.
3. The EU could benefit in practical terms by re-
balancing its foreign policy towards agreeing 
a pluralist framework between states with 
different interests and values, rather than 
prioritising the spread of its core values on 
the others. This should allow the EU to maintain 
its soft-power advantage over the long term. ■
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